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The California Legislature Could Amend Section 422 to
Address and Clarify Their Intended Scope of Protection
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SUFFICIENT SCOPE OF PROTECTION
VII. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
The California State Legislature has amended Penal Code section
422,1 commonly referred to as terrorist, criminal, or credible threats,
three times since 1988.2 In doing so, the Legislature declared that “every
person has the right to be protected from fear and intimidation,”3
recognizing the growing number and severity of threats against
California’s peaceful citizenry.4 Appellate courts have interpreted the
law to require an audible utterance to accompany threatening physical
gestures to fall within its ambit. This is an aberrant reading of the statute

1

CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 2010). Section 422 states the following:
Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will
result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the
specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by
means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat,
even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face
and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person
threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to
be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her
immediate family’s safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state
prison.
For the purposes of this section, “immediate family” means any
spouse, whether by marriage or not, parent, child, any person related
by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other
person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the
prior six months, regularly resided in the household.
“Electronic communication device” includes, but is not limited to,
telephones, cellular telephones, computers, video recorders, fax
machines, or pagers. “Electronic communication” has the same
meaning as the term defined in Subsection 12 of Section 2510 of Title 18
of the United States Code.

Id.
Id.
People v. Solis, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting People v.
Martinez, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
4
Id.
2
3
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and fails to protect a significant segment of our community, whose only
avenue of communication is through the medium of sign language.
This interpretation of section 422 would also provide would-be
perpetrators, who communicate via sign language, an avenue to threaten
others with impunity if their threats are conducted silently. This Article
will do the following: (1) examine the courts’ reasoning and application
of Penal Code section 422 in cases where hand gestures were used to
threaten; (2) analyze the relevant portions of the statute’s construction;
and (3) propose reasonable and logical grounds for a nuanced
application of section 422 to threats made using American Sign
Language.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PENAL CODE
SECTION 422
Currently, only one California case applies Penal Code section 422 to
a factual situation involving gestures. In People v. Franz, the victim
maintained a contentious, domestic, violence-filled relationship with the
defendant.5 The defendant, a jealous boyfriend, saw the victim, her
sister’s boyfriend, and a male friend talking on a street corner and
confronted them.6 The victim and the two male friends got in a cab and
left, seeking refuge at the victim’s home where they “shut . . . the
curtains and locked all the doors.”7 Someone repeatedly called the
victim’s home, though there was no answer. The defendant went to the
home and started knocking on the door.8 Receiving no response, the
defendant attempted to gain access through a window.9
Recognizing the defendant was not going to be dissuaded, the victim
agreed to come outside to talk to him.10 The defendant pushed his way
into the home, looking for the two men he had seen previously.11 The
defendant began striking one of the men “several times” as the victim
grabbed the cordless phone in an attempt to call the police.12 Without
successfully notifying law enforcement, the victim ran out of the house,
as the defendant redirected his attention toward her.13 The defendant
gave chase, “took the phone and punched her several times, causing her

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 777–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 777.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nose to bleed.”14 The defendant dragged her back into the home telling
her, “I’m going to fucking kill you.”15 When law enforcement arrived,
the victim ran outside but was too afraid of the defendant to tell the
officer what had happened.16 Later at the hospital, she fully divulged
what had transpired.17
As the officers were conducting their in-field investigation and
questioning of witnesses, the defendant positioned himself behind the
officer and “did a gesture like this, like shush. And then ran his finger
across his throat.”18 The victim’s sister’s boyfriend understood the
defendant was threatening to “slice his throat” if he continued speaking
with the police.19 As a result, the boyfriend stopped talking and only
shared the story of the threatening gesture later to another officer when
the defendant was no longer present.20
At trial, the officer testified that he had heard the “defendant utter[]
a sound that was either ‘shush’ or ‘sh’” while making the slashing
gesture.21 On appeal, the defendant argued there was insufficient
evidence “to support his conviction of terrorist threats” under Penal
Code section 422, as there was “no substantial evidence he made a
verbal, written, or electronic statement, as required by section 422.”22
The prosecution argued that “nonverbal conduct may constitute a
‘statement’ within the meaning of section 422” and cited “a
dictionary . . . definition of ‘verbal’ as including a verbal symbol.”23 The
appellate court located an alternate dictionary definition in which
“verbal” is defined as “concerned merely with words, as distinguished
from facts, ideas, or actions.”24
Based on the two definitions provided to the district court, the court
found statutory ambiguity and turned to other avenues for
interpretation. The court cited People v. Snyder, which held that
[w]hen language which is susceptible of two
constructions is used in a penal law, the policy of this
state is to construe the statute as favorably to the
defendant as its language and the circumstance of its
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id.
Id. at 777–78.
Id. at 778.
Id.
Id. at 779.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 782.
Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1482 (3d college ed. 1988)).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss3/12

Greer and Modell: When a Threat is Not a Threat: Why Persons Who Are Deaf or Hard o

2011]

When a Threat is Not a Threat

1301

application reasonably permit. The defendant is entitled
to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true
interpretation of words or the construction of [the]
statute.25
The prosecution went as far as to argue the similarity of the
defendant’s motions to sign language, that a “finger to lips and throatslashing constituted a verbal or written statement as surely as sign
language would.”26 But the Franz court made a special point to highlight
that “the People cite[d] no authority applying section 422 to sign
language.”27
The court ultimately held that there was credible evidence (the noise
to which the officer testified, in conjunction with the throat-slashing
gesture) constituting a threat to kill the victim if he talked to the police.28
The court limited its holding to the facts therein and stated, “we do not
have to decide whether section 422 requires that a defendant use a word
in order to fulfill the requirement of a ‘statement made verbally.’”29
This holding raises these questions: is the court’s understanding of
what constitutes a verbal communication too narrow, and can a person
be statutorily threatened using solely American Sign Language as it is
currently drafted?
III. THE CAUSES OF HEARING LOSS AND ITS PREVALENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES
Hearing loss can be divided into three main causal categories:
(1) idiopathic- or disease-based; (2) noise-induced; and (3) age-based or
presbycusis. Diseases attributed to hearing loss include childhood
infections such as mumps and measles and special infections such as
syphilis, Lyme disease, herpes, cytomegalo virus (CMV), mononucleosis,
chickenpox, pneumonia, influenza, and numerous other fungal
diseases.30 “Hearing loss is one of the most common consequences of

25
992 P.2d 1102, 1108 (Cal. 2000) (quoting People v. Overstreet, 726 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Cal.
1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26
Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783.
27
Id. (emphasis added).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 785 (emphasis added).
30
What
Other
Conditions
Can
Cause
Hearing
Loss?,
EHEALTHMD,
http://www.ehealthmd.com/library/hearingloss/HL_conditions.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2011).
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meningitis, especially bacterial or fungal meningitis.”31 AIDS has been
associated with ear infections leaving nerve damage.32 Individuals who
suffer from tuberculosis, forms of arthritis like rheumatoid arthritis,
lupus erythematosus, and diabetes often sustain hearing loss.33 These
conditions and diseases are not race or age specific.
There are three main types of hearing loss:
(1) conductive,
(2) sensorineural, and (3) mixed hearing loss.34 Conductive hearing loss
occurs in the middle or outer ear and generally leads to hard of hearing
conditions, not deafness.35 Sensorineural hearing loss is more serious,
occurring in the inner ear and is generally irreversible.36 Mixed hearing
loss occurs when there is damage in the middle or outer as well as
damage in the inner ear.37
The communities of individuals who are hard of hearing or deaf
represent a significant portion of our society. According to Gallaudet
University statistics, hearing loss is an extremely common disability that

31
Id.; see also Hearing Loss:
Risk Factors, MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 22, 2009),
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/hearing-loss/DS00172/DSECTION=risk-factors
(listing risk factors, including meningitis, that could lead to hearing loss).
32
See What Other Conditions Can Cause Hearing Loss?, supra note 30 (“Conductive and
sensorineural hearing loss both occur in people with AIDS. AIDS is also associated with
tumors in the head and neck that can cause hearing loss.”).
33
Id.
34
Types of Hearing Loss, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, http://www.asha.org/
public/hearing/disorders/types.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
35
Conductive Hearing Loss, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, http://www.asha.
org/public/hearing/Conductive-Hearing-Loss/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). The article
states that
[c]onductive hearing loss occurs when sound is not conducted
efficiently through the outer ear canal to the eardrum and the tiny
bones (ossicles) of the middle ear. Conductive hearing loss usually
involves a reduction in sound level or the ability to hear faint sounds.
This type of hearing loss can often be corrected medically or surgically.
Id.
36
Sensorineural Hearing Loss, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, http://www.asha.
org/public/hearing/Sensorineural-Hearing-Loss/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). This type of
hearing loss
occurs when there is damage to the inner ear (cochlea), or to the nerve
pathways from the inner ear to the brain. Most of the time,
[sensorineural hearing loss (“SNHL”)] cannot be medically or
surgically corrected. This is the most common type of permanent
hearing loss. SNHL reduces the ability to hear faint sounds. Even
when speech is loud enough to hear, it may still be unclear or sound
muffled.
Id. (listing possible causes of SNHL such as illnesses, exposure to loud music, aging, head
trauma, and the use of drugs that are toxic to hearing).
37
Mixed Hearing Loss, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, http://www.asha.org/
public/hearing/Mixed-Hearing-Loss/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
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affects more than three percent or 11.8 million Americans.38 According
to a recent study by the Western Interstate Commission for Higher
Education (“WICHE”),39 at a number of 3,086,866, California has the
highest population of deaf and hard of hearing individuals, “more than
five times that of the next largest state” population of deaf and hard of
hearing.40 The 3,086,866 deaf and hard of hearing individuals constitutes
8.6 percent of California’s population.41 As with most disabilities, there
is a spectrum of persons who are hard of hearing and deaf in terms of
severity. A significant segment of these citizens are classified as
“culturally deaf,” meaning their first native language is sign language; a
number of “culturally deaf” citizens only communicate through some
form of sign language.42
IV. PENAL CODE SECTION 422 HAS A POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE THAT WOULD
ALLOW A PERPETRATOR TO THREATEN THEIR VICTIMS WITH IMPUNITY
In 1989, sections 422 and 646.9 were amended, adding the term
“electronic communication device” as a prohibited conduit by which to
38
FAQ: Deaf Population of Individual States, Territories, & Localities, GALLAUDET U. (July
2004),
http://library.gallaudet.edu/Library/Deaf_Research_Help/Frequently_Asked_
Questions_(FAQs)/Statistics_on_Deafness/Deaf_Population_of_Individual_States_Territor
ies_and_Localities.html. The following statistical data is based off the 1994–95 United
States Census Bureau data collection and is an estimated population (from greatest to least)
of deaf and hard of hearing by state: California (1,169,273); New York (823,173); Florida
(809,571); Texas (727,512); Pennsylvania (624,061); Ohio (520,965); Illinois (512,818);
Michigan (426,772); New Jersey (357,699); North Carolina (340,459); Georgia (298,185);
Virginia (288,546); Massachusetts (286,122); Tennessee (267,724); Indiana (261,117);
Missouri (255,930); Wisconsin (234,452); Washington (221,077); Maryland (219,702);
Alabama (217,915); Kentucky (209,772); Minnesota (201,666); Louisiana (200,437);
Oklahoma (175,799); South Carolina (168,600); Arizona (167,652); Connecticut (153,573);
Iowa (144,346); Oregon (143,755); Mississippi (142,001); Arkansas (140,625); Colorado
(131,358); Kansas (117,430); West Virginia (115,491); Nebraska (76,506); Utah (62,299);
Maine (61,836); New Mexico (58,420); Nevada (54,195); Rhode Island (51,118); New
Hampshire (48,970); Hawaii (47,817); Idaho (46,424); Montana (39,433); South Dakota
(34,849); Delaware (33,184); North Dakota (31,362); Vermont (25,618); District of Columbia
(25,214); Wyoming (19,135); and Alaska (15,877). Id.
39
W. INTERSTATE COMM’N FOR HIGHER EDUC., http://www.wiche.edu/ (last visited Jan.
24, 2011). “WICHE and its 15 member states work to improve access to higher education
and ensure student success. [Their] student exchange programs, regional initiatives,
and . . . research and policy work allow [WICHE] to assist constituents throughout the
West and beyond.” Id.
40
W. INTERSTATE COMM’N FOR HIGHER EDUC. MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM, INFORMATION
GAPS ON THE DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING POPULATION: A BACKGROUND PAPER 6 (May
2006), available at http://www.wiche.edu/info/publications/InformationGapsResearch
Paper.pdf.
41
Id. at 14.
42
Hearing
Impairment
vs.
Deafness,
AUDIOLOGY
AWARENESS
CAMPAIGN,
http://www.audiologyawareness.com/hearinfo_impairdeaf.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).
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stalk and communicate criminal threats.43 In the Franz case, the
defendant argued that if the California Legislature intended so, they
could have expressly amended section 422 to include nonverbal
communication.44 The defense pointed to the language of Penal Code
section 646.9(g), which defines a possible course of conduct for a stalking
credible threat as “a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a
combination of verbal, written, or electronically communicated
statements and conduct.”45 The court agreed with the defendant’s
contention, finding the Legislature did not intend section 422 to include
nonverbal gestures as prohibited conduct.46
This analogy, drawn by the defense, is fundamentally defective.
Stalking, by its nature, is a pattern of prohibited physical conduct that is
designed to harass or place another in a constant state of fear or
paranoia, whereas a terrorist threat is a credible communication of
imminent peril designed to place another into a present state of
apprehension of bodily harm. To compare and analogize the statutory
construction of these two sections is an error. The actus reus prohibited
by law for these crimes are different; therefore, statutory language
describing the prohibited conduct would naturally prohibit different
forms of physical action. The 1998 amendment updating these sections
of the Penal Code was the Legislature’s attempt to keep pace with
technology (e.g., internet chat rooms and text messaging) and was not
designed to alter the fundamental tenets of the prohibited actus reus.47
A fair reading of the court’s reasoning in Franz would allow a
perpetrator to make terrorist threats, made with the specific intent to
place another in imminent fear of physical violence, and to escape
prosecution of this assault as long as they did not use a form of writing
or failed to make an audible sound. The perpetrator need not intend to
communicate with a person who is deaf or hard of hearing, but just be an
individual who understands the threatening sign language and was
placed in a state of reasonable apprehension of harm. This analysis
described in Franz gives a clever, inventive, and well-advised perpetrator
the opportunity to threaten people with impunity.

S.B. 1796, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/9798/bill/sen/sb_1751-1800/sb_1796_bill_19980925_chaptered.pdf (last visited Sept. 23,
2010). “An act to amend Section 1708.7 of the Civil Code, and to amend Sections 422, 646.9,
and 653m of the Penal Code, relating to stalking.” Id.
44
People v. Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
45
CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (West 2010).
46
Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 782–83.
47
Cal. S.B. 1796.
43
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V. OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO BETTER PERFECT AND FACILITATE THE ORIGINAL
INTENT UNDERPINNING PENAL CODE SECTION 422
A. Penal Code Section 422 Is Not Ambiguous and the Statutory Terms
Therein Ought to Be Credited with Their Proper Definitions in Order to
Effectuate the Intended Application of the Law
Although the Legislature could have used more precise and explicit
terminology, the language currently codified adequately conveys
grounds for terrorist threats communicated via sign language to be
prosecuted under Penal Code section 422.
When the court interprets the effect of a statute, they are guided by
the axiom that words will be given their plain language meaning48 and
understood in the context in which they are constructed.49 The court in
Franz grappled with the term “verbal” in its analysis and by its own
account found two “differing dictionary definitions”: first, “as including
a verbal symbol”50 and second, “concerned merely with words, as
distinguished from facts, ideas, or actions.”51 Finding ambiguity in the
statutory construction, the court was guided by People v. Snyder, which
held that when language in a penal law is susceptible of two
constructions, the language will be construed favorably to the defendant,
thus receiving the benefit of the doubt in interpreting words or the
construction of a statute.52
These two definitions are complementary, not contradictory. A
written language is a compilation of characters which the reader has
This axiom is also known as the rule of lenity. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 375 (1987) (“The doctrine of lenity is, of course, sound, for the citizen is entitled to fair
notice of what sort of conduct may give rise to punishment.”); see also Muscarello v. United
States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (declining to apply the rule of lenity); Evans v. United States, 504
U.S. 255 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563
(1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (same).
49
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance,
be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is
plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms.
Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning,
the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid
doubtful meanings need no discussion.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
50
Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 782.
51
Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1482 (3d college ed. 1988)); see also
supra notes 2324 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the term “verbal”).
52
992 P.2d 1102, 1108 (Cal. 2000) (quoting People v. Overstreet, 231 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Cal.
1986)).
48
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associated with audible tones and/or sounds. The first definition the
court cited should be understood to mean an expression of letters and/or
characters that build meaningful words. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“verbal” as an adjective which is “[o]f, relating to, or expressed in
words.”53 “Symbol” has been defined as a “letter, character, [or] sign of
written communication.”54
Here, a word would be an amalgamation of letters or characters
made with the intent of communicating through a written medium. The
first definition is a definition by example, giving the reader an example
of the form in which a verbal statement may occur. The second
definition serves the reader as a limiter, or definition by exclusion. In
this definition, the author is attempting to convey to the reader what a
word is not. Here the definition attempts to convey to the reader that
words are not intangible things like ideas or actions. These definitions
are not vague, ambiguous, or contradictory. Rather, they attempt to give
meaning to the same term by approaching it from alternate definitional
angles. The terms used in Penal Code section 422 are not ambiguous and
should be given their full definitional credit and not be framed by our
colloquial usage.
B. The Term “Verbal” Is Not Synonymous with the Word “Audible”
The court in Franz, makes an assumption that the statutory word
“verbal,” used in Penal Code section 422, has the same definition as the
word “audible.” It does not.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “verbal” as an adjective which is “[o]f,
relating to, or expressed in words.”55 It is not until the alternate or
second definition, “[l]oosely, of, relating to, or expressed in spoken
words,”56 that there is any indication of the manner in which the words
are communicated. Contrast the expression in words to the MerriamWebster’s Dictionary definition of “audible”: “heard or capable of being
heard.”57 These two words are closely related, in that they are describing
language and its transmission; however, the definition for “verbal” is
focused on the speaker’s means of communication of an idea, and the
definition for “audible” is centered on the mode of reception of another’s
idea. This would indicate that, while nuanced, these words are
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1696 (9th ed. 2009).
Symbol, THESAURAUS.COM, http://thesaurus.com/browse/symbol (last visited June
28, 2010).
55
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53, at 1696.
56
Id. (emphasis added).
57
Audible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/audible (last visited June 28, 2010).
53
54
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describing different components of a transmission of an idea or thought.
In short, “verbal” means expressed in words, and “audible” means the
capability of being heard. The court has confused these two definitions,
assuming they are synonymous; they are not.
Meaning can be conveyed by words through numerous forms of
transmission. American Sign Language (“ASL”) is globally recognized
and is a popular medium for conveying words and ideas for those who
are deaf or hard of hearing. Specifically, the “culturally deaf”58 utilize
ASL as their sole mode of communication.59
C. American Sign Language Is a Fully Recognized Foreign Language and As
Such, a Concrete Form of Communication, Which Should Be Considered an
Adequate Conduit of Expression to Satisfy the “Verbal” Transmission
Element of Penal Code Section 422
ASL uses visually transmitted signal patterns rather than
acoustically transmitted sound patterns to convey meaning.60 With its
origins rooted in seventeenth century Martha’s Vineyard where a large
and disproportionate percentage of the population was deaf,61 ASL has
become the fourth most widely used and understood language within
ASL contains phonology,63 morphology,64
the United States.62
CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA: VOICES FROM A CULTURE (1988)
(explaining that people who are culturally deaf are (1) audiologically deaf or hard of
hearing, (2) use a sign language, and (3) identify themselves with the larger cultural
group).
59
Hearing Impairment vs. Deafness, supra note 42.
60
Sign Language and Deaf Communication Methods and Information, DISABLED WORLD,
http://www.disabled-world.com/disability/types/hearing/communication/ (last visited
Sept. 7, 2010).
61
The History of American Sign Language, START AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE,
http://www.start-american-sign-language.com/history-of-american-sign-language.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2011). Hartford, Connecticut, was the home to Dr. Mason Cogswell
who recruited a local minister, Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet, to help educate his deaf
daughter, Alice. Id. In 1815, Gallaudet traveled to Europe in search of a method to help
young Alice. Id. Gallaudet traveled to Paris where he was exposed to the educational
methods of the National Institute for Deaf-Mutes which taught sign language. Id. After
returning from his journey, Gallaudet started his own school for the deaf named the
American Asylum for Deaf-Mutes (modern day American School for the Deaf). Id.
62
American Sign Language, MEDICINENET, http://www.medicinenet.com/sign_
language/article.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
63
Stephen R. Anderson, Phonology, http://bloch.ling.yale.edu/Files/Phonology.htm
(last visited Jan. 17, 2011). Phonology is
the study of the sound structure of units (morphemes, words, phrases,
utterances) within individual languages. Its goal is to elucidate the
system of distinctions in sound which differentiate such units within a
particular language, and the range of realizations of a given unit’s
sound structure as a function of the shape of other units in its context.
58
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semantics,65 syntax,66 and pragmatics,67 analogous to spoken languages.68
Where spoken languages are produced by the vocal cords and can be
duplicated in a linear written format, ASL is three-dimensional.69 ASL
simultaneously combines hand shapes, spatial orientation, and
movement of the hands, arms, or body, and facial expressions to fluidly
express a communicator’s thoughts and emotions.70
1.

California Recognizes the Benefits and Virtues of Sign Language as
Reflected by Its Specific Inclusion in Numerous Statutes and Its
Recognition as a Foreign Language in Many of the State’s Schools
and Colleges

California law generally embraces sign language as an integral and
trusted means of communication in judicial proceedings. California
Evidence Code section 754(b) states that “proceedings shall be
interpreted in a language that the individual who is deaf or hearing
impaired understands by a qualified interpreter appointed by the court
or other appointing authority.”71 The section goes on to clarify that a
sign language interpreter is a type of “interpreter”72 and that
‘intermediary interpreter’ means an individual who is
deaf or hearing impaired, or a hearing individual who is
able to assist in providing an accurate interpretation
between spoken English and sign language or between
Id.
64
Morphology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/morphology (last visited Sept. 7, 2010). Morphology is “a study and
description of word formation (as inflection, derivation, and compounding) in language.”
Id.
65
Semantics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/semantics?show=0&t=1283895331 (last visited Sept. 7, 2010). Semantics is
described in an alternate definition as “the meaning or relationship of meanings of a sign or
set of signs; especially: connotative meaning.” Id.
66
Syntax, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/syntax (last visited Sept. 7, 2010). Syntax is “the way in which linguistic
elements (as words) are put together to form constituents (as phrases or clauses).” Id.
67
Pragmatics, OHIO ST. U., http://www.ling.ohio-state.edu/~kdk/201/spring02/
slides/pragmatics-4up.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2010). “Pragmatics is the study of how
language is used and of the effect of context on language.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
68
American Sign Language Linguistic Research Project, BOSTON U., http://www.bu.edu/
asllrp/ (last visited June 28, 2010).
69
Wendy Sandler, Symbiotic Symbolization by Hand and Mouth in Sign Language,
SEMIOTICA, Apr. 2009, at 241 (Ger.).
70
Id.
71
CAL. EVID. CODE § 754(b) (West 1995 & Supp. 2010).
72
Id. § 754(d).
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variants of sign language or between American Sign
Language and other foreign languages by acting as an
intermediary between the individual who is deaf or
hearing impaired and the qualified interpreter.73
Here, the legislature has rightfully placed its reliance in ASL to help
mitigate and guard against due process challenges that criminal
defendants may assert. The Legislature also gives great significance to
sign language interpreters, as they are an integral conduit for the deaf
and hard of hearing while testifying, helping them to relay their
observations to the finder of fact.
A vast and growing number of schools and universities regard ASL
as an acceptable substitute for foreign language requirements, and
California Education Code section
California is no exception.74
51225.3(a)(1)(E) expressly states the following: “For the purposes of
satisfying the requirement [that a student complete one course in foreign
language], a course in American Sign Language shall be deemed a
course in foreign language.”75 Currently, more than a dozen California
universities accept ASL as a suitable proxy for foreign language
matriculation requirements.76
2.

The Transmission/Communication Element of Penal Code Section
422 Should Be Given the Same or Similar Consideration as the
Totality of Surrounding Circumstances Analysis Courts Have
Applied to the Unconditional/Unequivocal Element

California courts have looked to the surrounding facts and special
characteristics of the parties, applying a totality of circumstances
analysis, when assessing whether a threat falls within the prescription of
the unconditional and unequivocal elements of Penal Code section 422.77
Courts have chosen this approach because it best furthers the legislative
intent of protecting “every person . . . from fear and intimidation.”78 It
would additionally advance the Legislature’s intent to apply the same
totality of circumstances analysis when applying the transmission or
communication element of the statute.
Id. § 754(e).
Sherman Wilcox, Universities That Accept ASL in Fulfillment of Foreign Language
Requirements,
WASH.
STATE-AM.
SIGN
LANGUAGE
TEACHER’S
ASS’N,
http://www.waaslta.org/U_accepts_ASL_Wilcox%5B1%5D.pdf (last visited June 28,
2010).
75
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51225.3(a)(1)(E) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010).
76
Wilcox, supra note 74.
77
People v. Solis, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 464, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
78
Id. (quoting People v. Martinez, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
73
74
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In People v. Martinez, the court allowed the jury to consider evidence
of the defendant’s subsequent actions, setting fire to a building where
the victim worked a day after the defendant had made the charged
threat.79 The appellate court agreed with the defense that the threat, in a
vacuum, may not have conveyed a threat to commit great harm, but held
the trier of fact could consider all of the surrounding circumstances in
deciding whether the threat was ardent when conferred.80
In People v. Mendoza,81 the court also allowed the trier of fact to
evaluate peripheral information, expanding the scope to include unique
and subjective characteristics of the specific party’s personal history.82
Here, shortly after the charged threat was made, members of the
defendant’s gang parked their vehicle in front of the victim’s home and
honked the horn to gain her attention.83 This evidence was submitted to
show the lack of ambiguity of the threat, as the victim knew that the
defendant was a gang member and his threats should not be understood
as hollow.
The above are examples of the court utilizing the tools of logic and
reason to achieve the maximum desired effect of a statute. It behooves
the court to employ this same framework of analysis when applying the
verbal element of Penal Code section 422. In doing so, they would be
able to allow the trier of fact to understand the communication patterns
of the deaf and hard of hearing communities and to appreciate that sign
language is their form of verbalization, thus making threatening sign
language subject to Penal Code section 422 culpability.
3.

The California Legislature Could Amend Section 422 to Address and
Clarify Their Intended Scope of Protection

One avenue available to remedy Penal Code section 422’s deficiency
is to amend the existing codified language. The California Legislature
has amended Penal Code section 422 several times since its initial
enactment. These changes have updated the Code to encompass and
keep pace with technological advancements. The Legislature could
easily amend it again, so as to ensure protection for the deaf and hard of
hearing. Although the legislative process is often cumbersome and

79
80
81
82
83

62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 308 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.
69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
Solis, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473–74 (citing Mendoza, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 73234).
Id. at 474.
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fraught with political detours, new and explicit language would serve as
the most effective and legally clear option.84
VI. JURISDICTIONS OUGHT TO CAREFULLY EXAMINE THEIR CRIMINAL
THREATS STATUTORY SCHEME AND CONSTRUCTION TO ENSURE A SUFFICIENT
SCOPE OF PROTECTION
Many jurisdictions have codified similar language to California’s
Penal Code section 422; however, they have adopted broader expressive
language, selecting the term “communicate” or “conduct.”85 The election
84
The following is the existing statutory language, followed by two proposals for
alternative statutory language with added language in italics:
Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will
result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the
specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by
means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat,
even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out.
Cal. Penal Code § 422 (West 2010).

Amended language option 1: “Any person who willfully threatens to
commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to
another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made
verbally, made visually, in writing, or by means of an electronic
communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no
intent of actually carrying it out.”
Amended language option 2: “Any person who willfully threatens to
commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to
another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made
verbally, in writing, by means of an electronic communication device,
or conducted through American Sign Language, is to be taken as a threat,
even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out.”
Depending on the language adopted, this code section, as amended, could be an
opportunity to encompass threats communicated with street gang hand signals. While this
expansion would confer additional protection for California citizenry, it could have an
unattended negative correlative effect on charging and plea agreements for prosecutors.
The lesser count of a criminal threat is a “strike” qualifying act, while the completed
threatened act may not be. This dichotomy drastically complicates plea negotiations.
85
Criminal threats are classified and labeled differently state by state. Threatening
actions can be found under menacing charges. In Oregon, “menacing” is defined as
follows: “(1) A person commits the crime of menacing if by word or conduct the person
intentionally attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury.”
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.190(1) (2009). They can also be found under assault charges and
intimidation charges. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-1(a)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010)
(defining “Intimidation” as “[a] person who communicates a threat to another person, with
the intent . . . that the other person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act.”).
It furthermore can be found under its own standalone enumerated crime. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3419(a)(1) (Supp. 2009) (defining “Criminal threat” as “any threat to: (1)
Commit violence communicated with intent to terrorize another, or to cause the

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 [2011], Art. 12

1312 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

of these terms allows the courts broader discretion when applying the
statutory language.
Kansas court holdings include the following understandings: that
“[c]ommunicated intent can be inferred from physical acts as well as
verbal statements;”86 that “[a]ll circumstances surrounding the
communication, including the relationship between the parties, must be
considered in determining whether the communication in issue is a
terroristic threat;”87 and that in order to come within the purview of the
statute, making it unlawful to communicate a terroristic threat, the threat
need not be in any particular form or in any particular words.88
Although there is no case law specifically addressing the issue of
threatening sign language, these holdings may provide grounds to find
culpability in threats made by way of signing. Jurisdictions that have
deficient language or uninformed interpreting case law may need to
amend their statutes or advocate for a comprehensive judicial review to
ensure adequate protection for the deaf or hard of hearing.
VII. CONCLUSION
California courts have given strong indications that Penal Code
section 422 may require threatening gestures to be accompanied by an
audible utterance in order to attach culpability.89 This statutory reading
fails to protect a significant segment of our community that uses the
medium of sign language to communicate. This construction of Penal
Code section 422 provides would-be perpetrators, who verbalize via sign
language, an avenue to threaten others with impunity if conducted
silently. As codified, section 422 does provide adequate grounds for
terrorist threats communicated via sign language to be prosecuted.
Though the outcome in Franz would not have been dissimilar if any
of the above proposals had been applied, the court’s analysis provides
precious insight into its understanding of how Penal Code section 422
would be interpreted in the future. Without a finding of credible
evidence that the defendant made an audible sound, they might find
future charges lacking in foundation, leading to preliminary dismissals.
The court’s explanation and understanding of this statute is dangerous,

evacuation, lock down or disruption in regular, ongoing activities of any building, place of
assembly or facility of transportation, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such
terror or evacuation”); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.
86
State v. Cope, 29 P.3d 974, 978 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
87
State v. Abu-Isba, 685 P.2d 856, 863 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984).
88
State v. Knight, 549 P.2d 1397 (Kan. Ct. App. 1976).
89
People v. Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss3/12

Greer and Modell: When a Threat is Not a Threat: Why Persons Who Are Deaf or Hard o

2011]

When a Threat is Not a Threat

1313

and future application, as intimated, could obfuscate the spirit and intent
of the law.
From the California Legislature’s 1998 amending of section 422 to
encapsulate and expand its protection to the advancements in electronic
communication, it is reasonable to infer that this was a comprehensive
attempt to encompass all legitimate forms of word transfer. Why would
the Legislature intend Penal Code section 422 to leave the deaf or hard of
hearing unprotected when threatened through sign language? There is
no reasonable or logical explanation to believe that the Legislature
would not have intended to protect one of the most vulnerable segments
of our society. While a nuanced understanding of the law is required for
a proper administration of justice, so too is it required to ensure proper
protection for its intended class.
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